Introduction
Still critical after all these years? The past, present and future of Critical Theory in International Relations NICHOLAS RENGGER AND BEN THIRKELL-WHITE* Twenty-five years ago, theoretical reflection on International Relations (IR) was dominated by three broad discourses. In the United States the behavioural revolution of the 1950s and 1960s had helped to create a field that was heavily influenced by various assumptions allegedly derived from the natural sciences. Of course, variety existed within the behaviourist camp. Some preferred the heavily quantitative approach that had become especially influential in the 1960s, while others were exploring the burgeoning literature of rational and public choice, derived from the game theoretic approaches pioneered at the RAND corporation. Perhaps the most influential theoretical voice of the late 1970s, Kenneth Waltz, chose neither; instead he developed his Theory of International Politics around an austere conception of parsimony and systems derived from his reading in contemporary philosophy of science. 1 These positivist methods were adopted not just in the United States but also in Europe, Asia and the UK. But in Britain a second, older approach, more influenced by history, law and by philosophy was still widely admired. The 'classical approach' to international theory had yet to formally emerge into the 'English School' but many of its texts had been written and it was certainly a force to be reckoned with. 2 Relatedly, there were voices within the realist tradition, elsewhere, drawing on older traditions of thinking about international relations. Most notably of these was Hans Morgenthau, whose first (and most powerful) English language book was a concerted reaction against the 'scientific' approaches dominant in his adopted homeland. 3 The third approach, 4 often neglected in overviews of the discipline, was to draw on some form of Marxism. Much of this literature, though plainly relevant to international relations in the world, came from outside 'International Relations' as an academic subject. World Systems analysis, for example, was largely done in departments of sociology or history rather than in departments of political science or international relations. 5 Much the same is true of the peace research of Johan Galtung and his colleagues. 6 Into this rather static world, in 1981, two articles were published that announced the arrival in International Relations of forms of theory long familiar outside it. These essays were Robert Cox's 'Social Forces, States and World Orders' published in the LSE journal Millennium and Richard Ashley's 'Political Realism and Human Interests' in International Studies Quarterly. 7 Both these essays deployed variants of Frankfurt School critical theory to analyse the problematic of modern international relations. They were joined the following year by perhaps the single most influential book-length treatment of International Relations from a similar trajectory, Andrew Linklater's Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations. 8 If these works could be seen as the breach in the dyke, the torrent soon became a flood as theoretical ideas from many other areas of contemporary social theory began to be deployed in the context of international relations: feminism, Neo-Gramscianism, post-structuralism, post-colonialism; the list grew exponentially.
Twenty-five years on, International Relations theory looks very different. A robust, analytical and still heavily 'scientific' US academy now has strong elements of critical theory of various sorts lodged within it. The so-called 'constructivist turn', which is so influential in contemporary IR theory, draws very heavily on aspects of the critical turn that preceded it. 9 In the UK and Europe, it is probably fair to say that various forms of 'critical theory', alongside the now relaunched (and very different) 'English School', 10 constitute the main theoretical alternatives within the discipline. Cox and Ashley's interventions have also helped to open space for a growing body of normative thinking on international issues and a burgeoning interest in the intellectual history, including history of international thought, even if these developments are often not self-consciously part of the tradition of critical IR theory. 11 This interest crosses the Atlantic as well as involving philosophers, lawyers and political theorists from outside the study of international relations. 12 In short, critical theory -in all its various guises -has had a huge impact on the study of international relations over the last twenty-five years.
Now is an appropriate time, then, for a closer look at precisely what that impact has been, where the various strands that have made up 'critical theory in international relations' now stand, what problems they face and what their future might be. That was the brief given to the contributors to this Special Issue of the Review of International Studies. The third section of this Introduction will introduce the essays that make it up. First, though, we lay the groundwork by providing an overview of the main strands of critical IR theory that have emerged since 1981. We go on to outline some of the most important reactions to the critical turn, both hostile and sympathetic. The essays can then be read in that intellectual context, as defences of critical theory against its more radical critics or as engagements with controversies that have taken place within the critical camp. We conclude with a short exposition of what we see as the state of critical theory within the IR discipline.
Trajectories in critical theory
This section draws out what we see as the four core strands of critical IR theory: Frankfurt School critical theory, neo-Gramscian theory, feminism and various strands of post-structuralism. Obviously, this is a somewhat restrictive conception but it was already more than enough to deal with in a single Special Issue. In the next section, we draw out the relationship between these strands of theory and other critical approaches that might have been included, notably critical constructivism, the 'new normative theory' and some kinds of critical IPE.
The influence of the Frankfurt School
In retrospect, it was predictable that, just as the scientific assumptions that generated much of the dominant work in International Relations from the 1960s onwards came into the subject from other fields (natural science, mathematics, and economics), 13 other theoretical innovations would make their way into the study of international relations. It was also predictable that they would initially be couched largely in opposition to those trends. It should not be surprising, then, that it is Frankfurt School critical theory 14 that was the first on to the field. Cox's Millennium essay, made use of the founding document of Frankfurt School critical theory to illustrate the differences between the approach he saw as dominant, and that which he saw as necessary. That document was Max Horkheimer's essay 'On Traditional and Critical Theory'. 15 Cox pointed out, as Horkheimer had, that 'traditional theory' -represented, for Cox, by US style 'positivist' International Relations -assumed that it somehow stood 'outside' the phenomena it was investigating. This forced it to assume a stance of evaluative neutrality ('value-free social science') and to adopt an effective complicity with the world as it was. It became, in Cox's words, 'Problemsolving theory', taking the world as an untheorised given and trying to work out how better to theorise, given that world.
Critical theory, on the other hand, recognises that the theorist is situated as much as a creature of the historical circumstances of the time as that which is being investigated. 'Theory', Cox said, is 'always for someone and for some purpose'; 16 it speaks from a particular socio-historical situation and to one. As such it recognises the historical particularity of that situation and seeks to understand why and how it came to be as it is and what possibilities for change there might be implicit in it. Critical theorists refer to this method as immanent critique.
This method raises a second concern that is present in Cox's work but became much more explicit in Andrew Linklater's Men and Citizens the following year, and in Mark Hoffman's influential Millenium article from 1987. The search for the possibilities of change should be anchored in an emancipatory project that seeks, not just the possibility of change as such, but rather points to change in a certainprogressive -direction. This is what led Hoffman to suggest, in his article, that critical IR theory was, as he put it, 'the next stage' of IR theory, since it included a normative, emancipatory element. 17 In a later essay, Linklater neatly summarises the main planks of what we might now call 'Frankfurt School' critical international theory as follows. First, that it takes issue with 'positivism' (as critical theorists of all stripes tend to refer to the allegedly scientific mainstream of IR theory). Second, it opposes the idea that the existing structures of the social world are immutable and 'examines the prospects for greater freedom immanent within existing social relations'. Third, it learns from and overcomes the weakness inherent in Marxism by emphasising forms of social learning 13 For the integration of these fields into political science, see William Poundstone, Prisoner's Dilemma (New York: DoubleDay, 1992 21 The idea of hegemony was one they picked up and developed from Gramsci. Cox, and soon after a number of others, were following a similar trajectory in International Relations scholarship. Craig Murphy, Kees Van der Pijl, Barry Gills, Tim Sinclair and Steven Gill and a growing number of younger scholars, have all helped to develop what is now usually referred to as 'Neo-Gramscian' critical theory. They have elaborated and expanded on its insights, particularly in subfields such as International Political Economy (IPE) and Global Governance. 22 Gill (in 'Gramsci', 1993 -see n. 22) outlined the hallmark of the 'Gramscian' research programme in International Relations as follows: First, ongoing attempts to reconsider epistemological and ontological aspects of world order, in the context of past, present and future. Second, continuous efforts in methodological, theoretical and conceptual innovation. Third, concrete historical studies of the emerging world order in terms of its economic, political and sociocultural dimensions with a view to its emerging contradictions and the limits and possibilities these may imply. Fourth, addressing and developing related ethical and practical approaches to global problems.
There are obvious parallels here to the Frankfurt inspired agenda outlined by Linklater above, but also some differences. Much less emphasis is placed on the kind of dialogic and discursive elements that interest Linklater, much more on the concrete empirical analysis of 'real world' processes and the linking of that to theoretical and emancipatory reflection and concrete political struggle. It is no accident that it is in IPE that Gramscian critical theory has established itself most firmly.
A not dissimilar trajectory is visible in another body of theory that emerged in International Relations at the same time: feminism. If neo-Gramscian theorists primarily tried to uncover the ways in which economic activities had shaped the international world that the mainstream tended to take as a given, feminist theorists pointed to the ways in which gender had done so. Given the diffusion of feminist scholarship through the academy over the last thirty to forty years in a wide range of fields, 23 this development was long overdue. Though not all feminist writers set out to be critical theorists, there are clear affinities between the feminist project of uncovering the gendered nature of contemporary social reality and the broader critical project in IR, with its emphasis on theorising the untheorised in an effort to promote emancipatory change. of the best and most acute writing in all the traditions that make up critical IR acknowledges the (sadly often unfulfilled) potential for fruitful two-way interaction between feminist writing and other critical traditions. In this issue, for example, Craig Murphy suggests that neo-Gramscian scholars could learn more from the relationship between scholarship and activism in the international feminist movement and Kimberly Hutchings points to the importance of feminist explorations of the relationship between difference and universality for broader thinking in IR.
Deconstruction
Although the opening shots in the critical campaign were fired by what we might call the 'emancipatory' wing of critical theory, they were swiftly joined by writers coming out of a different theoretical trajectory. From the mid to late 1960s onwards, one of the most important of all late twentieth century intellectual fashions began to influence (or infect, according to taste) a wide range of fields in the humanities and social sciences. Usually called post-structuralism (and often, though not very helpfully, postmodernism) this was actually a catch-all term for a loosely related set of theoretical positions derived from two principal sources, the diffuse but very real influence of Heidegger in France in the 1950s and the disillusion with traditional versions of Marxism that accompanied the rise of the student left and the events of 1968. In the 'deep background', as it were, and connected with the influence of Heidegger, was the growing stature of Nietzsche as a thinker. The two major thinkers to ride the crest of these waves were Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida and their work became the most influential on scholars in International Relations. Perhaps the first IR scholar to really develop a post-structural position was Richard Ashley. Moving beyond the argument he had outlined in Political Realism and Human Interests, Ashley began to develop a more radical critique of conventional discourses of IR. Initially, on the basis of a reading of Foucault's work, Ashley argued that 'post-structuralism' was a permanently 'critical' discourse, indeed the only really critical theory, since it did not, indeed could not, offer an alternative position or perspective to any other as there was no ground upon which such a perspective could be established. This he took to be the logic implicit in Foucault's view that all claims of knowledge implied a regime of power and vice versa, and that you could not therefore establish a position outside the competing power/knowledge claims. 25 Elements of this reading persist in post-structurally influenced IR theory -as witnessed by David Campbell's claim that his work should be seen as a form of political criticism, though one which significantly he sees as an ethos -but it has also changed in important ways. Now, most post-structurally influenced scholars would agree with William Connolly's gentle critique of Ashley to the effect that:
(we) contend, in a way that overtly presents itself as a contestable supposition, that we live in a time when a variety of factors press thought into a rather confined and closed field of discourse . . . the political task at a time of closure and danger is to try and open up that which is enclosed, to try to think thoughts that stretch and extend the normal patterns of insistence '. 26 Although this is the general position that post-structurally influenced critical IR theory has taken, there remain a wide variety of approaches to applying poststructural insights. Rob Walker, following perhaps Derrida more than Foucault, has sought to focus on the way in which a range of dichotomies can be read as having structured the conditions of modern IR: inside/outside (to use the title of his best known book) but also identity/difference, time/space, self/other, inclusion/exclusion, unity/diversity and universality/particularity. 27 James Der Derian shares something of this sensibility, particularly the focus on the time/space dichotomy, but has chiefly focused on the implications of this for what he calls the chronopolitics of security in today's world where chronology is elevated over geography and pace over space. 28 There are also feminist readings of not dissimilar problematics, such as those of Christine Sylvester and Spike Peterson on IR and IPE in general and, in the UK, Jenny Edkins' meditation on Trauma and Memory in IR, Cindy Weber's work on gender, representation and film in Contemporary IR and Kimberly Hutchings' articulation of a broadly post-structural feminist sensibility. 29
Reactions to critical theory

Rejection
The critical turn was a self-conscious attack on the mainstream of International Relations. It should not surprise us, then, that most leading so-called 'positivist' scholars, largely, though by no means exclusively, in the US, have tried to reject the entire critical project. They have two grounds for this rejection. The first is based on a largely methodological assumption -rarely argued for in any detail -that IR should be subsumed into something called 'political science' and the methods that govern political science are essentially akin to the natural sciences. The assumptions 26 on which critical theory (of any sort) have always been based, then, are simply mistaken. The second assumption, often spelt out in greater detail, is that critical theory can offer neither a proper explanation of IR nor appropriate normative reflection since it is essentially 'relativist' and cannot offer anything by way of guidance for action or policy. This was broadly Keohane's strategy in his 1988 Presidential address to the ISA (later published), 'International Institutions: Two Approaches'. 30 Keohane sought to suggest that IR scholarship was divided between a rationalist 'mainstream; and a range of (very diverse) so called 'reflectivist' approaches. Until (reflectivist) critical theory developed its own 'research design' it would remain forever on the fringes of the field.
Some postmodern accounts, such as Ashley's, would accept the charge of relativism. The vast majority of critical writers, though, would not. As we saw above, even many contemporary post-structuralists see themselves as engaged with the world of practice. When it comes to feminist IR, Frankfurt School and neoGramscian writing, the criticism is clearly too scattershot to hit the mark. Even those that it does catch -chiefly post-structurally inclined IR theory -are not really relativists in the rather 'straw man' sense usually implied. Taking a hermeneutic stance 'beyond objectivism and relativism' may be contestable but it is not, by definition, relativistic.
A minor variant of this critique has also been to suggest that critical theory is essentially what one prominent contemporary realist -Randall Schweller -has called 'fantasy theory', 31 that it consists chiefly of ever more ingenious attempts to build castles in the air but meantime, he suggests, the rest of us have to live in the real world of states and their conflicts. There is much that might be said about this astonishingly bad reading of what most critical theorists have been saying but one obvious point is simply to aver that few, if any, critical theorists of any stripe would take the royal road to what, in a different context, John Rawls called 'ideal theory'. The critical theorists' concern has always been, first and foremost, with the situation of the here and now and how it came about: only then might we find possibilities of change immanent within it. Their analysis might be wrong, of course, but it is no more a fantasy than is Schweller's.
The original, methodological critique fairs no better, we suggest. It is simply a restatement of the claims to science that have been attacked by a succession of theorists of various stripes, at least since Hans Morgenthau's withering critique in Scientific Man versus Power Politics in 1946. The 'Critical' version of it comes, as we have suggested, in a variety of forms, all of which are certainly arguable, but simply restating the equally contestable claims of science in an ever louder voice hardly seems likely to persuade.
What we might term the 'rejectionist' critique therefore, seems to us to fail, both on its own terms, and because it does not really engage seriously with the arguments put forward by critical theorists. 30 
Springboarding
A more significant response to the critical turn has been to use the intellectual space that was opened up by writers such as Cox and Ashley to push a wide range of intellectual projects. The rise of critical International Relations theory started to re-embed the discipline of International Relations more firmly within the broader social sciences. 32 This has triggered a rapid expansion of the theoretical scope of the discipline. It may be a slight overstatement to claim that all these new intellectual developments are a direct consequence of the arrival of critical theory, but the critical turn was certainly an important factor in legitimating a wide range of borrowings from social and political philosophy. The result has been a huge increase in the diversity of perspectives within the discipline. Keohane's 1988 lecture was bracketed by two books each of which could be seen to make common cause with aspects of the critical turn but which were also rather different in both form and content. The first, Nicholas Onuf's World of Our Making 33 appeared the year before Keohane's lecture, and was the first to suggest that IR should draw on the wide range of work that had been generically termed 'constructivist' in other areas of the academy and which drew on, for example, the later philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein. To see the world as a construction, Onuf suggests, liberates us from the flat and sterile materialism of conventional IR theory and allows us to investigate the manner in which the construction was achieved and thus also the possibilities for change and reconstruction within it. This was obviously close to the kind of things the emancipatory wing of critical theory had been saying, though in Onuf's hands the emancipatory element was far less pronounced.
The second book, appearing the year after Keohane's lecture, overlapped considerably with Onuf's but was also much less Wittgensteinean. This was Friedrich Kratochwil's Rules, Norms, Decisions. 34 Kratochwil's book was a study of the manner of practical reasoning through rules and norms as it affected both domestic politics and international relations, and argued that in this context the character of international relations was established through such norms and such practical reasoning. He too, therefore, was arguing for a 'constructivist' account of international relations.
Again, much of the theoretical apparatus deployed so ably by Onuf and Kratochwil came from outside IR, indeed outside the social sciences. The 'constructivist turn' had been influential in philosophy and social theory for some fifteen years before it reached International Relations but, unlike the critical theories just discussed, it could be read in a more or a less 'critical' way. In the hands of Onuf and Kratochwil, it shared a good deal with aspects of critical international theory, but in other hands, for example those of Peter Katzenstein and especially Alexander Wendt, it came much closer to a modification of more conventional IR theory than an outright challenge to it. Saying the world is 'constructed' can be taken in more or less radical ways. For Wendt, for example, it led to the view that 'ideas mattered' in 32 36 'Constructivism' quickly became the acceptable face of 'reflectivism', at least in the United States, a development which to some extent sundered the link of constructivist scholarship with the wider critical turn. However, the extent to which that is true depends on which constructivist one looks at.
The critical turn also opened space for a far wider range of 'critical' approaches than we have been able to focus on in this special issue. In particular, there are now a bewilderingly wide range of critical approaches in contemporary IPE. 37 Generally, these approaches are more empirically driven than the work we have focused on and have had less impact outside questions of political economy, but there are often clear overlaps with themes we have addressed.
Perhaps the writing that has broadest significance in the wider literature comes from other versions of Marxism -for example those developed by Fred Halliday, Kees Van der Pijl and, perhaps more powerfully still, by Justin Rosenberg. 38 The other major source of inspiration has been the impact of globalisation, which has added powerful empirical impetus to consideration of key critical themesidentity, difference, meaning, discourse, the double implication of 'domestic' and 'international', the role of conceptions of space and time, the importance of the 'destruction of distance', the ambivalent but always present role of technology and so on. This empirical impetus has triggered work that is closer to a more mainstream, albeit still largely constructivist, set of debates (for example in the work of Jan Art Scholte or Richard Higgott) as well as some work in sociology and wider areas of social theory that was much closer to other areas of critical theory (for example the work of Zygmunt Bauman or Saskia Sassen). 39 Finally, one should also include the 'new normative theory' -some of which was actually very old -which also supported these developments even if the actual positions adopted were not always close to those taken by critical theorists. Perhaps especially notable here is the evolving work of David Held, Antony McGrew and their various collaborators around the ideas of globalisation, global governance and cosmopolitan democracy which links with many of the ideas motivating critical theory in IR. 40 
Assessment
Overall, the critical turn has opened space for an enormous expansion of methodological variety within the IR discipline. However, the consequences of that are by no means set in stone. As we saw in the previous section, Frankfurt School and neo-Gramscian theorists both expected a more complex understanding of the historical evolution of the international system to uncover the potential for emancipatory change. Post-structuralists, on the other hand, were inclined to draw the message that almost nothing can be predicted and were concerned that any attempt to do so would be implicated in coercive structures of power/knowledge. The constructivist position seems to be sufficiently open to allow one to adopt some of the new methodological insights of the broader social sciences without necessarily adopting a recognisably critical position.
This variety of new approaches emphasises just how significant the critical turn has been in bringing the discipline of International Relations into closer contact with the broader social sciences. In the process, though, it has raised a whole new set of questions about the relationship between a variety of ontological and epistemological positions on the one hand, and different normative and political commitments on the other.
Immanent critique
Within the critical camp, debate has focused on exactly the questions that were raised at the close of the previous section. At its most basic, one might think of the conflict as between the post-structuralists on the one hand and 'the rest' on the other. The issue goes right back to Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer's The Dialectic of Enlightenment. 41 Adorno and Horkheimer set out to challenge the danger of scientific totalitarianism that they saw in both liberalism and classical Marxism. They were concerned about the dominance of instrumental reason, which threatened to overwhelm the concern with human freedom and emancipation ushered in by the Enlightenment. Their hostility to prescription and social engineering, though, tended to deprive them of the philosophy of history that, for Marx, had grounded a steadfast confidence in progress. Adorno, famously, despaired to the point where all he could do was cling to the hope that his writing would be a 'message in a bottle' for future generations. 42 40 The Habermasian response was a highly complex and sophisticated rehabilitation of reason as a non-instrumental, radically democratic, 'dialogic' collective enterprise. 43 The neo-Gramscian response is less well articulated. Gramsci himself seems to have maintained a broad faith in the potential for a transition to socialism on essentially Marxian historical materialist grounds. IR neo-Gramscians clearly accept Marxist accounts of the development of capitalism. They are historically materialist in that the social relations of production are seen as a key driver of history. However, they are also generally inclined to keep potential 'progress' more open, seeing it as contingent on the forms of social movement and struggle that emerge in practice, rather than dictated by the inevitable triumph of the 'universal class'. That has the advantage of the potential to sidestep the narrow Marxian focus on class exploitation, but it does undermine the solid ground that Marx claimed to have for believing that progress would take place. 44 Contemporary critical theorists working in both these traditions are clearly uneasy about the post-structuralist challenge. The more rigid one's philosophy of history (and therefore the firmer the basis of confidence in emancipation), the greater the danger of subsiding into undemocratic and closed forms of instrumentalism becomes. On the other hand, the more one accepts contingency, uncertainty and the multiplicity of political projects, the less guidance emerges for concrete political action.
Much of the debate within the critical camp, then, revolves around this central question. Some theorists see others as having overly closed emancipatory projects. Feminist writers, in particular, have often rightly felt marginalised from neoGramscian writing. 45 As we will see in this issue, others have argued that there is a critical silence surrounding the developing world and, perhaps particularly, postcolonial questions about culture. Habermasians and neo-Gramscians, on the other hand, both criticise the post-structuralists for a radical openness that cuts out the ground on which to stand in making a critique or looking for progress.
The problems raised, of course, also have an impact on debates with those outside the critical camp. In an exchange with William Wallace, for example, Ken Booth rejected the charge that critical theorists were 'monks' -flippant, self-indulgent, with nothing to offer those who were engaged in, for example, talking to diplomats in newly emerging democracies about the difficulties and concerns that would inevitably confront them. In response, he claimed that critical theorists were speaking to a practical audience, but a different practical audience; civil society, social movements, activists, those in the international community) which certainly might include some working within state governments) who were working for a better world and perhaps also for a different world. That was to be preferred to the role of 'technocrats, simply trying to make the existing machine work better'. 46 Underlying this tension, between more and less open political projects and conceptions of social causation, there is a very fundamental philosophical question that is not often addressed about the extent to which there is any relationship at all between knowledge of the world and action in it. It is a question that has been relatively well rehearsed in a wide range of philosophical literature. There are a variety of approaches, ranging from some interpretations of Wittgenstein, to readings of Heidegger, which suggest that the relation is nowhere near as clear or direct as it would have to be for the kind of carryover on which critical theory has wanted to rely. Once one engages with the kind of idealist, linguistic and phenomenological debates that triggered the critical turn, this kind of fundamental philosophical question can no longer be sidestepped.
Contents and themes of this Special Issue
Having reviewed the main strands of critical theory and the kinds of debate that they have triggered within the IR discipline, we now turn to the main body of the issue. The contributions all engage with this context in one way or another. In particular, most of them can be seen as providing answers to the questions we raised in the previous section. We have chosen to arrange them so that they begin with articles that focus primarily on methodological questions about the philosophy of history and conclude with more practically-oriented contributions on the role of critical theory in promoting political change. This section provides a brief summary of each contribution, relating it to the themes and criticisms raised above. We then conclude with a brief evaluation of the past contribution and future potential of critical IR theory.
The issue begins with Friedrich Kratochwil's assessment of critical IR theory from the point of view of a 'sympathetic [constructivist] outsider'. Perhaps predictably, Kratochwil is inclined to see the principal contribution of critical theory in terms of an opening up of methodological space in the discipline. He argues that critical theory is 'critical' primarily in its reluctance to treat social 'facts' as natural kinds. Theory in the social sciences should be evaluated on the basis of ideas such as completeness, relevance and appropriateness, rather than simply the positivist criteria of logical rigour, demonstrable proof and universal validity.
However, he is less sympathetic to Ashley's particular project in his 1981 article. He argues that Ashley's issues with the 'silences' of neorealism did too little to uncover the silences of classical realism. Instead, Kratochwil raises three challenges that he feels critical IR theory should address.
Firstly, in good constructivist fashion, he calls for a rediscovery of politics in terms of 'which types of constitutive understandings authorise particular practices'. Hobbesian theory, for example, was politically significant because it helped both to authorise the sovereign state and the liberal distinction between public and private spheres. The place theorists can play in building the social world in this way places a responsibility on all academics as 'experts', one which is sometimes neglected at the expense of career building. Yet the issues of the constitution of the international system are increasingly crucial under globalisation and even critical theories have more to do in theorising these changes. 47 Secondly, Kratochwil takes issue with variants of critical theory that continue to hold philosophies of history that expect the triumph of Enlightenment: the transformation of human beings into 'rational actors' engaged in the 'pursuit of happiness'. He argues that the resurgence of complex and significant identity politics continues to place straightforward assumptions about future universality in serious question. Finally, and most fundamentally, he raises questions about the adequacy of contemporary theories of action. If we reject the 'rational actor' model, how do we account for the relationship between rationality, desire, appropriateness and duty in accounting for human action?
Kratochwil avoids taking any position on specific political projects. Instead, he concentrates on methodological terrain, arguing that critical theory has raised new questions for International Relations. It has, appropriately, complicated the task of assessing different theories and views of the world. However, it may not have done enough to question old orthodoxies, particularly in terms of the assumptions of progressive Western Enlightenment.
Kratochwil's article raises challenges that are most directly relevant to our first three articles by self-consciously critical theorists. Although they might not describe what they are doing in his terms, all three raise questions about how we should conceive the constitution of global politics and all three, to different degrees, question any conception of progression towards enlightened modernity. In their different ways, they all do this through an interrogation of the philosophy of history.
Coming from a background in IPE, Ronen Palan is particularly conscious of the difficulties of discussing the contemporary globalised economy within the framework of state-centric IR theory. He argues that these difficulties cannot be resolved by 'bolt-on' additions ('institutions', 'interdependence' 'domestic politics', and so on). Rather IR theorists should be (and critical theorists often are) resituating international relations within the broader social scientific enterprise of understanding the human condition. This includes a sociological reflection on some of the questions Kratochwil raises about the nature of human agency. Drawing on Deleuze and Guatarri, Palan suggests that the 'rationality' of orthodox IR is something that has been produced through historical social processes. If orthodoxy asks how (rational) people achieve what is good for them; heterodoxy asks why people desire what is bad for them, how particular structures of motivation are produced. The result is a vision of international relations theory as analysis of a far more complex set of social processes, with a particular focus on those with an international dimension, which are often missed by other social science disciplines. (There are echoes, here, of Linklater's 'sociology of global morals with emancipatory intent'). We need an approach that is 'globally encompassing, historically oriented and focused on political institutions'.
Palan goes on to sketch what such a critical IR/IPE would look like. It is a vision that might be particularly associated with a British approach to critical IPE that sees itself as following in the footsteps of Susan Strange. He argues that even the neo-Marxism of someone like Cox retains a somewhat mechanistic, structural picture of global political economy. Instead, we should work towards a more contingent, evolutionary conception, drawing on a conception of the state that can be found in rather different readings of Marx and Hegel, reaching its fullest expression in French regulation theory.
We should see the state as a historical juncture; as the mediator between a variety of social forces. Similarly, we should see capitalism as evolving as much through specific historical institutions and inter-state struggles (or emulation) as through some grand process of the unfolding of an abstract 'mode of production'. 48 The evolution of capitalism is full of experiments, some of which have proved abortive but others of which have diffused through a process of learning and adaptation in ways that have stabilised capitalist states against their expected collapse. We need a critical global political economy that understands the general tendencies of capitalism but also looks at the specifics of individual jurisdictions.
On the whole, Palan celebrates a newfound heterodoxy in the International Relations discipline. He provides an optimistic picture of a discipline that already partly exists. His principle criticism is of an overly deterministic and mechanistic conception of history that pays too little attention to the changing, historical, social construction of human agency and to the complex interactions that shape it. Instead, he calls for a more evolutionary conception of history that has some broad tendencies but also much more space for unexpected contingencies. It is a much more plural vision of international relations than the mainstream provides. We may find, therefore, that interesting things go on in the margins, as well as at the centres of power (one might think of Palan's own work on 'offshore'). 49 In the end, though, Palan does not question the idea that what will emerge is one history of the development of contemporary capitalism, albeit a more complex, nuanced and disorderly one than we often find in orthodox IR. Palan's attention to complexity, diversity and social construction in the understanding of history have echoes in our next two contributions, but these contributors also set out to question the idea that there may be 'one' understanding of history at all.
Kimberly Hutchings makes an argument about conceptions of time that run through different strands of critical theory. Like Kratochwil, she is anxious about an uncritical assumption of progress towards Western modernity. Echoing Adorno and Horkheimer's critique of modernity, she argues that Marxian accounts of critical theory (including the Frankfurt School and neo-Gramscian writing) tend to be tainted by a conception of unitary progress, embedded in particular philosophies of history (Gramsci's progress to socialism) or a faith in supposedly transcendental human capacities for freedom and reason (in more Habermasian writing such as Linklater's or Ashley's 1981 article).
The postmodern alternative, she argues, provides a powerful corrective to the danger of 'messianic' theories, that can only be redeemed by the future. Postmodernists are right to be concerned that even aspirations towards justice will frequently fail to do justice to the indeterminacy of the future. However, postmodern writing can still be deterministic in its own way. Postmodern writing in the style of Virilio or Der Derian, continues to privilege the shift from modern to postmodern time in a way that privileges an accelerated temporality, which is primarily an experience of the West. A Western experience of time comes to stand for international political time in general. Although postmodern writing that draws more from Derrida avoids this problem, it too is forced to rely on an unjustified and only allegedly transcendental preference, in this case for the 'inexhaustibility of the possibilities of deconstructive critique'.
Hutchings argues for an approach that 'embraces analytical reason in pursuit of social justice but does not allow it to erase the question of heterotemporality from the history of the modern subject'. She suggests that this kind of theory may be assisted through a multiple conception of time, which acknowledges a range of intersecting histories that evolve concurrently, each with their own logic and meaning, but also each vulnerable to unexpected and unpredictable interactions with other processes and other histories.
In more concrete terms, this kind of theorising would need to learn some of the lessons that feminist theory has learnt in dealing with the contradictions between universal values and particular historical circumstances. As with Palan's writing, the vision is one of a mixture of predictability and contingency. Hutchings argues that this 'permits a lateral kind of theorising in which multiple, parallel and interacting presents may be understood in relation to one another, in this sense it is systemic as well as pluralist'. The hope is to avoid, on the one hand, subsuming different histories under one privileged master narrative and, on the other, retreating into an ethical commitment to a mysterious 'difference'.
Hutchings' writing is based on some very abstract considerations of the temporal logic of particular forms of explanation. Hobson provides some concrete historical reasons for drawing similar conclusions. He argues that even much critical IR theory remains tied within a Eurocentric outlook that tends to read history backwards from contemporary Western hegemony. The result is a misunderstanding of both the way the current international system was constructed historically (an overly endogenous and predetermined understanding of the rise of the West), and of the potential sites of agency for future change (a systematic undervaluing of Eastern agency). The East is seen as a residual that either inevitably succumbs to the rise of Western modernity or as a place in which Western practices and values are adopted and corrupted.
Hobson briefly sketches some of the lost East-West interactions that have shaped important parts of the modern world, through processes of interaction, of 'interstitial surprise'. He highlights the way in which the thirst for Chinese technology sucked the Europeans into international expansion in the first place (in attempts to acquire gold to exchange for Chinese goods) and went on to drive military revolutions in Europe. He cites the way financial techniques 'developed' by Italian bankers were borrowed from the Islamic world and beyond. He also traces the interactions between Western and Eastern black liberation movements from the abolition of slavery to the French revolution, to Haiti and back to anticolonial movements and the civil rights movement in the US. We can see echoes here of Hutchings' discussion of separate but intersecting histories.
Hobson argues for what he provocatively calls a 'post-racist' IR, which would read history in a less-Eurocentric way. In the process, it would recover Eastern agency in the past and open space for East-West dialogue in the present. In a move that is very reminiscent of Linklater's 'praxeological' approach, Hobson argues for a dialogical uncovering of neo-racist histories so that neo-racism can be held up against the professed ideals of the West in the same way that racist colonialism once was. In other words, where Hutchings draws largely post-structuralist conclusions (though non-relativist ones), Hobson calls for a more Habermasian use of public debate and reason to challenge existing conclusions.
So far, our discussions have been predominantly theoretical and methodological. They have primarily addressed questions about the philosophy of history and how those questions shape our understanding of possible political futures. All three have drawn attention to the need to continue to open up discussion further and to allow for more contingency than is present in much existing critical theory. On the other hand, all three have conceptualised that relationship differently. Palan comes closest to retaining a Marxist philosophy of history in which our knowledge of the world is not fundamentally problematic. However, we should constantly guard against the risk of over-simplifying causal processes and over-determining our expected findings. Hobson, too, sees problems with our actual understanding, more than with our potential ability to understand. His solution is very much a Habermasian one of improved dialogue but there is a particular emphasis on dialogue about history and with Eastern 'others'. Hutchings is more radical still, implying at least that even our ways of knowing about history need to be problematised and unsettled.
All three contributions, though, concentrate primarily on ways of understanding the world and move only a short distance in the direction of thinking about how to change it. Hobson and Hutchings both suggest that rethinking history and historiography is, itself, a potentially emancipatory exercise but say little about the potential political agency that might be involved in any subsequent struggles. In our next contribution, by Craig Murphy, that balance is reversed. Murphy has something to say about rethinking international relations but he is primarily concerned with the relationship between academic endeavour and political action.
He argues that Cox, and particularly Ashley's interventions, chimed with a mood that was already present amongst many American graduate students involved in peace research. Increasingly complex game theory which revealed the potential for learning in repeated games, had paved the way for an acceptance of the second of Habermas's three kinds of science, introduced in Ashley's article: the historicalhermeneutic sciences with their focus on verstehen, or empathic understanding of other human beings, their histories and world views. Murphy argues that critical IR has managed to hold open a place for this kind of endeavour within the US academy but has struggled to avoid being marginalised.
He suggests that there is still much more that could be done to listen to 'voices from below'. For Murphy, though, that is more likely to mean connections with anthropological and comparative work, rather than the postcolonial cultural theorists referred to by Hutchings and Hobson. He argues for greater attempts to think oneself into the world views of the marginal or, better still, to lend them a voice directly. Here, some feminist scholars have led the way in uncovering women's experiences at the 'margins' of the international system.
Murphy also argues that feminist scholars have been better at creating work that forms a bridge between academics and activists: work in which theorists take seriously the potential to change the world through what they write. He argues that critical IR scholars have much to learn from the feminist movement's success in creating UN resolution 1325 on 'Women, Peace and Security' or from Mahbub ul Haq's role in producing the UN Human Development Reports. While the human development approach may be reformist, rather than revolutionary, Murphy argues that there is much to be learned from it. To change the world, academic work needs to create an inspiring vision but one that is incorporated into and comes to inform real struggles. It must be accessible and contain concepts that can be reinterpreted to be meaningful in a wide range of vernaculars, informing struggles worldwide. The overall message is one of (partial) success in the academy that has yet to be matched in terms of practical global impact and influence. Murphy is inclined to concede Wallace's allegation that critical theorists tend to be 'monks'. What is required is greater scholarly engagement with the world's marginalised and with social movements in order to challenge political structures more directly than simply through engagement with problematic forms of knowledge in the academy.
In his recent writing, Robert Cox has acknowledged that he has perhaps been better placed to theorise the world as it is than to perform the role of a Gramscian 'organic intellectual', articulating a new common sense that can intellectually unite a potential counter-hegemonic block. Murphy praises his honesty (one of the attractions of Murphy's work, here and elsewhere, is his realistic pragmatism; implicitly academics should strategically consider how they can best change the world). 50 However, he also challenges academics to seek out opportunities to become better placed and to create opportunities for those that are to create academic work. That will help academic practice in lessening the distance between theorist and political actor, enhancing hermeneutic understanding of the objects of research, and ensure closer links between critical theory and political action. Andrew Linklater's piece appears, at first sight, to provide a sharp contrast to Murphy's. Linklater's work continues his attempts to create critical theory on a grand scale, looking for the forms of immanent sensibility that can be built on to create a more inclusive and cosmopolitan global order. However, his piece also offers a corrective to his earlier work, grounded in a concern with uncovering new resources that can be drawn on to increase the motivational purchase of cosmopolitan ethics.
He argues that Kantian inspired critical theory, such as the work of Habermas, can privilege reason as a source of morality, at the expense of other potential sources. He argues that there is scope for an investigation of an 'embodied cosmopolitanism' building on the relationship between suffering and solidarity found in early Frankfurt School writing. Linklater draws on the writings of Weil, Schopenhauer, Horkheimer and Adorno to emphasise the importance of the recognition of suffering, revulsion at inhumane acts, and the idea of 'injurability', rather than the fear of sanction or meditation on categorical imperatives, in driving our ethical convictions. These themes are also echoed in approaches to human rights that centre on vulnerability to harm. He suggests that these primal ethical sensibilities may represent the immanent potential of a cosmopolitan ethics, to be realised fully through a long process of social learning, in the same way that Habermas famously argued that the first speech act contained the potential for communicative action.
Linklater calls for a rediscovery of these themes and an investigation of their role in collective social learning over time. The impulse to assist suffering strangers, that is present universally but activated to varying degrees in different societies, points to a need for further exploration of the ways in which this immanent ethical impulse can be built on to create a cosmopolitan ethic that is based on more fundamental human impulses than the claims of reason.
Murphy and Linklater, in their different ways, raise doubts about the motivational purchase of contemporary critical IR theory. Nonetheless, they are calling for a continuing reinvigoration of the critical enterprise, rather than a rejection of it.
Richard Devetak provides us with a robust defence of the fundamentals of critical theory, against charges of utopian imperialism. His article, then, can be seen as a response to some of the rejectionist critiques that we reviewed earlier in this Introduction. Devetak tries to show that critical cosmopolitanism steers a middlecourse between statism and anti-statism. He begins with a review of statist claims that any support for humanitarian intervention reopens space for metaphysically sanctioned, violent, moral crusading, that transgresses the limits to violence inaugurated by the modern states system.
Devetak traces this kind of critique back to the statism of Pufendorf who was concerned to prevent the kind of religious warfare that plagued early modern Europe. He deploys an eminently critical theoretic critique of statist claims to an autonomous, value-free sphere of the political. He argues that this conception of world order in fact privileges the normative value of security over claims for freedom. As Kant pointed out in his own criticism of Pufendorf, law that is bereft of moral standards pertaining to freedom is morally and politically dangerous.
However, one does not have to be fully Kantian to offer this kind of critique. For one thing, Habermasian critical cosmopolitanism shifts the imaginary dialogue of rational individuals to a communicative form of actual public dialogue. Perhaps more importantly, Kant saw law as ultimately subordinate to morality, while Habermas sees the two as complementary. Human rights, then, are not some form of ghostly authority that descends from the heavens. Rather, they are the product of socially produced temporal authority in the form of constitutionalism and democracy. Likewise, the authority of law must be morally questionable but through public debate and constitutional processes, rather than unilateral violent challenges.
When we return to the challenge of humanitarian intervention, then, critical theorists proceed cautiously. There is a recognition of the role the sovereignty principle plays in the constitution of world order but also a reluctance to see that sovereignty principle as transcendent and absolute. Humanitarian intervention should only be authorised through constitutionalised public channels such as the UN system and decisions should be made on a case by case basis, weighing the evidence and the important role that the non-intervention principle has in limiting violence.
Conclusions
We should not expect everyone to endorse the critical project in International Relations -one of the authors of this Introduction broadly does, one is broadly, though sympathetically, sceptical. However, we would argue that it is increasingly difficult to deny its importance to the discipline. For some, who would like to see the discipline settle into a single paradigm of 'normal science', that may be unsettling or even a sign of weakness. For the rest of us, though, it is a sign of strength. If Cox and Ashley are right, critical theory in its broadest and most fundamental sense, is necessary and, indeed unavoidable. All theory is situated and a single theory means that we only get a view from one place in the world, with its particular goals and purposes. A diversity of theories helps us to understand, argue over, and, for the more optimistic, even accommodate a far wider range of political positions. Critical theory has moved the discipline a long way in the right direction even if there continue to be problematic silences -most notably about the role of the non-Western world in shaping contemporary international relations.
Within this widely shared enthusiasm for a more complex and nuanced understanding of the production of the social world, though, there is room for a good deal of variety and disagreement. In particular, as we suggested in the section on 'immanent critique', there continue to be divergent views about the relationship between understanding the world and changing it. For post-structuralists, any contribution academia can make to change is largely through adopting the attitude of critique -through setting up constant challenges to orthodox narratives and the power they embody. For neo-Gramscians, on the other hand, for whom there is generally greater faith in the potential for social movements to pursue active emancipatory projects, there needs to be a closer relationship between new understandings and active political action. Frankfurt School theory seeks more to lay out a road-map for forms of increasingly inclusive collective reasoning that, presumably, take place out in the world. Academics may play some role in these processes but, for Habermas at least, there is some danger in crossing the line between theorist and activist. 51 We see those differences of opinion and orientation in the different ways in which our contributors propose engaging with the 'East', the 'postcolonial' or the 'developing world'. Hutchings and Hobson see that engagement in terms of postcolonial theory, while Murphy points to involvement with concrete political struggles in the developing world (postcolonial theorists might question the distinction but many others would not). 52 These differences certainly illustrate that critical theory has not produced a definitive answer to the ways in which emancipation is to be promoted. At the same time, though, they point to the potential for an ongoing and creative process of mutual engagement between different strands of critical theory. It is this debate and interaction that forces theorists to clarify their answers to difficult questions and challenges, such as the prospects for emancipation in the developing world or the precise relationship between academia, activism, and political change (if any such relationship can exist). Hopefully, the essays in this special issue will encourage exploration in all these issues.
Regardless of the outcomes of that exploration, critical theory has provided vital new resources for our understanding of international relations. Many issues of contemporary importance, particularly the continuing salience of identity politics, non-state violence and global economic processes, simply could not be addressed with the theoretical resources available within the discipline in the 1970s. The critical turn has forced scholars to develop a more nuanced understanding of the historical development of the world we inhabit and of the ways in which it is sustained by highly complex social processes. For some, that understanding provides important resources for confronting forms of exclusionary power. For others it simply makes the discipline of International Relations a far more intellectually stimulating and satisfying one to be working in. There is no reason to think that critical theory will cease to contribute to both these tasks in the years to come.
